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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/791,853	03/04/2004	Ryo Takeshita	US-163	5567

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EXAMINER	
MARX, IRENE	
ART UNIT	**PAPER NUMBER**
1651	

SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD OF RESPONSE	MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
3 MONTHS	02/15/2007	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire 6 MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.

Office Action Summary	Application No.	Applicant(s)	
	10/791,853	TAKESHITA ET AL.	
	Examiner	Art Unit	
	Irene Marx	1651	

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

1)☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on *03 January 2007*.

2a)☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b)☐ This action is non-final.

3)☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

4)☒ Claim(s) *1,4 and 8-10* is/are pending in the application.

4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.

5)☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.

6)☒ Claim(s) *1,4,8-10* is/are rejected.

7)☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.

8)☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.

10)☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a)☐ accepted or b)☐ objected to by the Examiner.

Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).

Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).

11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

12)☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).

a)☐ All b)☐ Some * c)☐ None of:

1.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.

2.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.

3.☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____.
4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____ .
5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
6) ☐ Other: _____.

DETAILED ACTION

The amendment filed 1/3/07 is acknowledged. Claims 1, 4 and 8-10 are being considered on the merits.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

> The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 1, 4 and 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Claim 1 is incomplete in the absence of a recovery step for the product produced.

While there is no specific rule or statutory requirement which specifically addresses the need for a recovery step in a process of preparing a composition, it is clear from the record and would be expected from conventional preparation processes that the product must be isolated or recovered. Thus, the claims fail to particularly point out and distinctly claim the "complete" process since the recovery step is missing from the claims. The metes and bounds of the claimed process are therefore not clearly established or delineated.

Claim 1 is vague and indefinite in the recitation of "a processed product thereof".

Claim 1 is vague and indefinite in the recitation of "soluble-type MMO". A definition should be provided in the claim to clarify the invention.

Claim 10 is vague and indefinite in that the extent of hybridization under (b) is not set forth. Is it 100%, 10%, 1%, 0.1%?

The rejection under 35 U.S.C 112, first paragraph is withdrawn in view of applicant's averments.

Claims 1, 4 and 8-10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lloyd *et al.* taken with Stainthorpe *et al.* and West *et al.*

Lloyd *et al.*, disclose the bioconversion of methane to methanol with a processed product obtained from *M. trichosporium* (See, e.g., page 461, paragraph 1) and also disclose that the genes encoding for soluble methane mono-oxygenase have been cloned and sequenced. See,

e.g., page 462, paragraph 4. In addition, the reference teaches a method of culturing mutant strains of *M. trichosporium* which have lost the ability to inherently use an alkane (page 466, paragraph 1) and which have been transformed with soluble methane monooxygenase genes such that the recombinant microorganisms become capable of using an alkane such a methane (page 465, last paragraph). That the transformed microorganisms make at least some methanol can be presumed from the disclosure at page 461, from which it is clear that at least some of the methane used is biotransformed to produce at least some methanol.

The reference differs from the invention as claimed in that it does not disclose the production of an alcohol such as methanol wherein the transformed microorganism is *Escherichia coli,* for example. However, West *et al.* disclose the transformation of *E. coli* with methane monooxygenase genes, that are expressed. In addition, Stainthorpe *et al.* discusses the genetic composition of the mono-oxygenase from *Methylococcus capsulatus.*

Accordingly, one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in transforming *Escherichia coli* with the genes obtained from strains of a *Methylococcus capsulatus* strain for the production of an alcohol from an alkane by using a processed product of the microorganism containing the enzymes of interest.

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made to modify the process of Lloyd *et al.* by using a transformed strain of *Escherichia coli* or a processed product thereof as taught by West *et al.* for the expected benefits of reducing the concentrations of atmospheric methane by producing methanol from methane in an economic and efficient manner.

Thus, the claimed invention as a whole was clearly *prima facie* obvious, especially in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Response to Arguments

Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not deemed to be persuasive.

"[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the

prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (Claim was directed to a Novolac color developer. The process of making the developer was allowed. The difference between the inventive process and the prior art was the addition of metal oxide and carboxylic acid as separate ingredients instead of adding the more expensive pre-reacted metal carboxylate. The product-by-process claim was rejected because the end product, in both the prior art and the allowed process, ends up containing metal carboxylate. The fact that the metal carboxylate is not directly added, but is instead produced in-situ does not change the end product.).

Furthermore, the process is claimed in terms of the composition used to make it which is claimed as a product-by-process. Since the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the myriad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make comparisons therewith, a lesser burden of proof is required to make out a case of prima facie anticipation/obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature than when a product is claimed in the conventional manner. MPEP 2113. Where the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation or obviousness has been established. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977). "When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not." In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Therefore, the prima facie case can be rebutted by evidence showing that the prior art products do not necessarily possess the characteristics of the claimed product. In re Best, 562 F.2d at 1255, 195 USPQ at 433.

Response to Arguments

Applicant's arguments have been fully considered but they are not deemed to be persuasive.

Applicants argument is correct. The claims are directed to a process rather a product. However, the product used in the process is claimed as culturing "*E. coli* transformed by a DNA comprising", which is seen as a product by process.

Also applicant fails to recognize that the process requires the use of the transformed strain or of a "processed product thereof". This recitation reads on any processed product that contains the enzymes regardless of its origin.

"[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process." In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (Claim was directed to a Novolac color developer. The process of making the developer was allowed. The difference between the inventive process and the prior art was the addition of metal oxide and carboxylic acid as separate ingredients instead of adding the more expensive pre-reacted metal carboxylate. The product-by-process claim was rejected because the end product, in both the prior art and the allowed process, ends up containing metal carboxylate. The fact that the metal carboxylate is not directly added, but is instead produced in-situ does not change the end product.).

Furthermore, the process is claimed in terms of the composition used to make it which is claimed as a product-by-process. Since the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the myriad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make comparisons therewith, a lesser burden of proof is required to make out a case of prima facie anticipation/obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature than when a product is claimed in the conventional manner. MPEP 2113. Where the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical in structure or composition, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, a prima facie case of either anticipation or obviousness has been established. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977). "When the PTO shows a sound basis for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not." In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 709, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1658 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Therefore, the prima facie case can be rebutted by evidence showing that the prior art products do not necessarily possess the characteristics of the claimed product. In re Best, 562 F.2d at 1255, 195 USPQ at 433.

It is noted with all due respect that the claims are not directed to the expression of particular enzymes, but only to the a bioconversion of an alkane to an alcohol using any transformed *E. coli* comprising the touted genes. There is no indication that all of the genes are expressed in order to carry out the process, particularly whenever a process product is used.

The conditions of culturing *E. coli* are routine in the art and are not seen to confer patentability to the process.

Therefore the rejection is deemed proper and it is adhered to.

No claim is allowed.

Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Irene Marx whose telephone number is (571) 272-0919. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F (6:30-3:00).

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Michael G. Wityshyn can be reached on 571-272-0926. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300 .

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

Irene Marx
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1651